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Abstract
The next Moscow City Duma elections will be held on September 8th with an
option of Internet voting. Some source code of the voting system is posted online
for public testing. Pierrick Gaudry recently showed that due to the relatively small
length of the key, the encryption scheme could be easily broken. This issue has
been fixed in the current version of the voting system. In this note we show that
the new implementation of the ElGamal encryption system is not semantically
secure. We also demonstrate how this newly found security vulnerability can be
potentially used for counting the number of votes cast for a candidate.
1 Introduction
The Internet voting system developed for the Moscow City Duma elections had a public
testing during the month of July. Some of the system’s code was posted online [git19],
and the organizers asked the public to test several attack scenarios [Pub19]. The
system is poorly documented, but from the source code and brief descriptions of the
system [Kri19], we know that it uses the Etherium blockchain and ElGamal encryption.
In one of the attack scenarios, the organizers publish a challenge consisting of the public
key and some encrypted messages.1
Recently Pierrick Gaudry [Gau19a] discovered that the implemented encryption
system used a concatenation of three ElGamal encryptions each with a key of length
256 bits. Gaudry showed that since the keys were too short, each private key could
be retrieved in minutes. Moreover, Gaudry provided a very short and beautiful script
computing the secret keys from the public keys. In the same note, Gaudry remarked
that the implemented version of ElGamal worked in groups of even order, which means
that it leaked a bit of the message. Both of these issues have been fixed in the current
version of the Internet voting system. Gaudry [Gau19b] acknowledged that these
specific issues have been fixed, but he is still doubtful about the security of the system.
(In particular, he says [Gau19b] that he cannot properly test the system due to the
∗Harvard University
1https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/
1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/encryption-keys/keys/public-key.json#
L1-L5 and https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/
1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/encryption-keys/data/encrypted-datums.csv#
L1-L10
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lack of documentation, and is concerned about potential flaws caused by the recent
big changes fixing the key length issue.)
In this note we show that the new implementation of the encryption system also
leaks a bit of the message. This is caused by the usage of ElGamal where the message is
not mapped to the cyclic group under consideration. We show that this flaw potentially
can be used for counting the number of votes cast for a candidate, which is illegal (until
the end of the election period).
After the publication of this note, Pierrick Gaudry told us that he did warn the
developers of the system that they should make sure that the system design does not
allow attackers to encrypt elements outside of the group. As we show in this note,
even the messages generated by the system (let alone an attacker) do not necessarily
belong to the group.
2 Attack
The current implementation of the electronic voting system uses the ElGamal public
key encryption scheme. The source code is available in [git19], and the encoding
procedure is provided in Appendix A. Below we summarize the current implementation.
Let p = 2q + 1 and q be primes of length about 1024 bits, and let Qp be the group
of quadratic residues modulo p. Note that |Qp| = (p − 1)/2 = q. The system picks a
g ∈ Qp generating Qp. Let pk ∈ Qp and sk ∈ {1, . . . , q} be the public and secret key
respectively, and pk = gsk. A message m ∈ Z∗p is encoded as a pair
Epk,sk(m) = (g
r,pkr ·m) ,
where r ∈ {1, . . . , q} is a random number.
The problem with the current implementation is that m is allowed to be any integer
from {1, . . . , q−1} which is naturally mapped to an element of Z∗p. For semantic security
(under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption), the message m should instead be
hashed to one of the q elements of the group Qp generated by g. In the case when m
is not necessarily picked from the group of quadratic residues, the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption does not hold. Moreover, such a system is not semantically secure.
If m ∈ Qp is a quadratic residue, then for every choice of randomness of the
encryption algorithm Epk,sk(m) = (c1, c2), the second component of its encoding c2 is
a quadratic residue. Indeed, if g,m ∈ Qp, then g = x2,m = y2 for x, y ∈ Z∗p, which
implies that
c2 = pk
r ·m = gr·sk · y2 = (xr·sky)2 ∈ Qp .
Similarly, if m is not a quadratic residue, then pkr ·m is not a quadratic residue either.
Due to Euler’s criterion, there is an efficient way to distinguish the two cases:
x ∈ Z∗p for a prime p > 2 is a quadratic residue if and only if x(p−1)/2 = 1. Since this
exponentiation can be performed in time poly(log p), this gives an efficient distinguish-
ing attack.
In order to see that the implemented code indeed applies ElGamal to elements
outside of the group generated by g, one can apply Euler’s criterion to the published
encrypted messages. In Appendix B we provide Python code showing that exactly five
out of the ten published messages are quadratic residues modulo p.
2
3 Example
Due to the lack of documentation and only some code available online, we cannot say
for sure which parts of ballots are encrypted. The following lines of code suggest that
only the “deputy id” field might be encrypted2:
var dataToEncrypt = parseInt($(this).data(’value’));
...
return signer.getSignedTransaction(votingId, dataToEncrypt, entropy,
encryptor);
and
<input class="bulletin__radio" type="radio" name="deputy"
value="{$deputy.id}" />
The “deputy id” field stores the id of the voter’s chosen candidate. While the attack
distinguishes two identical ballots with different votes with high probability regardless
of which parts of the ballot are encrypted, for simplicity in this example we will assume
that only the “deputy id” field is encrypted. Also, for this example we take the
currently published group Z∗p where
p =10062759081450625618037903678618826196600591242500860802791085970455088
29615914188038720723057459046019130152450978128758867982127126946624453
23678201384359740027439588690880234391145675099291004487668846511981135
30933109486902142540395785614572268133031351548262091859360232929939444
1379077427748866822254003 .
If the number of candidates is k ≤ 4, and the deputy ids are integers from 1 to k,
then the adversary can easily count the number of votes cast for candidate number 2.
(In particular, if there are only two candidates, then the adversary can count the total
number of votes for each of the candidates).
Indeed, since 1, 3 and 4 are quadratic residues modulo p, and 2 is not, it suffices to
raise the encrypted message to the power (p−1)/2 to check whether the vote is cast for
candidate number 2. In Appendix C we give Python code emulating the implemented
encryption system, and give an example of how to count the number of encryptions of
the message 2 among encryptions of messages from 1 to 4.
We emphasize that this attack will distinguish (with high probability) two messages
that differ only in their vote, regardless of the values of the deputy ids and which fields
of the ballots are encrypted. Let k be the number of candidates. Note that exactly half
of the elements of Z∗p are quadratic residues. Assuming the uniform distribution of the
plain messages we have that the probability of distinguishing a vote for one candidate
from the votes for other candidates is 0.5 for k = 2, and is k
2k−1 for k > 2.
2See the following links for the code on github: https://github.com/moscow-technologies/
blockchain-voting/blob/1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/voting-form/
src/ballot/static/js/forms/mgik/election.js#L108-L123 and https://github.com/
moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/
voting-form/src/ballot/common/module_tpl/election/default/show.tpl#L59
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4 Suggested Fix
The described security vulnerability is a major issue of the implemented cryptographic
scheme. We note that the provided attack does not recover the secret key as required
by the public testing scenario [Pub19], but rather breaks the system without recovering
the secret key.
On the other hand, we believe that there might be an easy way to fix this issue.
Since the current implementation already assumes that the message 0 < m < q =
(p− 1)/2 (see line 13 in the code block in Appendix A), one can use a trivial hashing
procedure to map each such message m to the group of quadratic residues.
In the encoding procedure, we suggest to check whether m(p−1)/2 = −1 mod p. If
the equality holds, then m is not a quadratic residue, but −m is. Therefore, one can
set m← p−m and continue the encoding procedure.
In the decoding procedure, an analogous step will be required. If the decoded
message m ≥ q, then it also should be negated (m← p−m).
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4
A Current Implementation of ElGamal
Below we provide the current implementation of the ElGamal encryption in the Internet
voting system.3
async encrypt(data, entropy) {
if (!data) {
throw new Error(’Data must present!’);
}
if (!entropy) {
throw new Error(’Entropy must present!’);
}
const dataAsBI = new BigInt(data.toString());
const entropyAsBI = new BigInt(entropy.toString());
if (dataAsBI.compareTo(this.Q) >= 0) {
throw new Error(’Data to encrypt can not be bigger or equal that
(P-1)/2!’);
}
if (entropyAsBI.compareTo(BigInt.ONE) <= 0) {
throw new Error(’Entropy for Session Key must be Integer bigger than
1!’);
}
if (entropyAsBI.compareTo(this.moduleP) >= 0) {
throw new Error(’Entropy for Session Key can not be bigger or equal
Basis Module P!’);
}
const randomBigInt = await getRandomBigInt(BigInt.ONE,
this.moduleP.subtract(BigInt.ONE));
const xoredRandomBigInt = randomBigInt.xor(entropyAsBI);
const sessionKey = trimBigInt(xoredRandomBigInt, this.moduleP.bitLength()
- 1);
const sharedKey = this.publicKey.modPow(sessionKey, this.moduleP);
const a = this.generatorG.modPow(sessionKey, this.moduleP).toString();
const b = sharedKey
.multiply(dataAsBI)
.remainder(this.moduleP)
.toString();
return { a, b };
}
3https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/
1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/smart-contracts/packages/crypto-lib/src/
elGamal.js#L84-L125
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B Published Encrypted Messages are Not Quadratic
Residues
In this Appendix we use the provided public key and encrypted messages4 to show
that not all messages are quadratic residues in Z∗p . Here c2 is the set of the second
components of the encrypted messages (that is, each element of the set is pkr ·m where
m is some plain message, pk is the public key, and r is a random number). The code
shows that only five out of ten elements are quadratic residues (give 1 when raised to
the power (p− 1)/2).
p =
10062759081450625618037903678618826196600591242500860802791085970455088296159
14188038720723057459046019130152450978128758867982127126946624453236782013843
59740027439588690880234391145675099291004487668846511981135309331094869021425
403957856145722681330313515482620918593602329299394441379077427748866822254003
q = (p-1)//2
c2 = [
86911001506497462251782638567319361833688978813664946437333829354738909404
43974481927929263283486987233406326466505025027434679060583881689706232630
52860581382950559847777412555501704989450676046755496358356631412743565509
63994173797345489306417174072514309856175754908122436241421564859178326320
313204945649,
32994578715846315625334282465389128113015193084444994471583135772127926449
51892161427453570566766298979864185170520616403124797427010730707520161094
83404053598174999416617877699551805519137361275465665467691230764443752248
89357541488942667685714188203805416972085863674686599803137288027861639262
227344813980,
25605451399106620676652873102021964641362454624148409311459772958496440670
16843578315908545184077772794593830979151616819810966255709567920814130778
19709806694723689969137957383923170349530451483441188337477065322871518389
97509598299206147956479381022563215978764100195629663712388182647511089787
862332483202,
30936197551567269685847042352240834287171756541862382295858852516666762117
55805979729879023007285286880732674891989007741022633330800550368742563469
41237089009381794632389798562078456796442958644789501357076108208779625474
70703268773776147336174270678101221755152924933175072952910690305403946708
512011344065,
90189227659365697355063500941760536836478537551461759945631823319091683131
30539947043416222984580270526152593756457555485599018740243229324226849605
61239260442729637671756134870576696053584273031857981168518983390538640849
29055706240055307151918736952456608210700937953363208336695605308414504363
789714782355,
91764714915834445310265717136195446845915020510854708634828807741642908650
88805234016509342009913809428795919722926613847539079055997816788187991705
26245002211336442034207826902363786376681934271623388852857592304132784015
33846260888398253877915981254520562872698617685705979612448346470413913994
4https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/
1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/encryption-keys/keys/public-key.json#
L1-L5 and https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/
1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/encryption-keys/data/encrypted-datums.csv#
L1-L10
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244174120780,
53180133541691920877303393106622876213880557470163604793597655634027675133
60685116768376758300338878651961955633191844125587620057500524945640239322
77996165942274611488630312874402187304375485303772307277867299568052321426
13661312171461386140429576621530845469410809123204273518058446975266361694
186911940244,
96389110287648758509344773386657594488132549702589565012028823522666392603
23174326871289534690190117827254235251942037419181816826781045590593293711
55623633657479236340811419693309298082823008055773940379928788914612436976
30183068655120651685499248763092459000930306871431366198968873609555301941
599393034947,
68868518968718401961947565883286957678496859516081208645391394051517430601
54089569868014396600078685718742310976349636761884312463762214119090170143
67814111630789237262689248078371187306393398854088463937893954685309796570
18007065848405280697276892839194542147616119874097494557367533448036396670
81357573332,
59049331935932409191703521981449178033897833739363938803374780496048381081
67852649116009537459386386032599267182731855221804003545963016545542412314
67392800236514010370577555635998585837533974218865577533874244033450031333
65685878245562130520111649077186632157205095851334912141011894784614717824
328145876601
]
for i in range(len(c2)):
print(pow(c2[i], q, p))
C Example
Here we show that with high probability one can distinguish encryptions of one message
from the encryptions of other messages. In this example we use the currently provided
public key for the ElGamal system.5 We generate a hundred of random encryptions of
the messages from 1 to 4. Then without the knowledge of the secret key, we correctly
recover the number of encryptions of the message 2.
import random
p =
10062759081450625618037903678618826196600591242500860802791085970455088296159
14188038720723057459046019130152450978128758867982127126946624453236782013843
59740027439588690880234391145675099291004487668846511981135309331094869021425
403957856145722681330313515482620918593602329299394441379077427748866822254003
q = (p-1)//2
g =
20938162663634717592050150871604811965450185147804653686210341370048875526465
65192598809608149897753169371105819433388566048465513249705171128931623257482
20949810611902707966342172282736385317307210244235915353395023927031589746870
88258365877782810885461860894240185695001397437423927797525752628688868571010
5https://github.com/moscow-technologies/blockchain-voting/blob/
1d4f348681e961420a28e8a3a3d64719c4ddc628/encryption-keys/keys/public-key.json#L1-L5
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pk =
69869939556699578412481990448414288405398435179055114398103563207158851026044
17268760023814098454244173381151935563527447828022461894488632630303059380694
21286985815829955355067923635563794223005965324347558568201679805005654774823
09964287055106318673831750120449183092965628809034498878410377075732012129326
def encrypt(data):
if (data >= q):
print(’Data to encrypt can not be bigger or equal that (P-1)/2!’)
sessionKey = random.randint(1, p-1)
sharedKey = pow(pk, sessionKey, p)
a = pow(g, sessionKey, p)
b = sharedKey * data % p
return (a, b)
#number of candidates is 4, their ids are {1, 2, 3, 4}.
count = [0] * 5
encryptions = []
for i in range(100):
candidate = random.randint(1, 4)
count[candidate] += 1
encryptions.append(encrypt(candidate))
for i in range(1, len(count)):
print(’Number of votes for candidate %d is %d’ % (i, count[i]))
notQResidues = 0
for (a, b) in encryptions:
if pow(b, q, p) != 1:
notQResidues += 1
print(’\nNumber of encrypted votes for candidate 2 is %d’ % notQResidues)
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